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Active	Shooter	Security	at	the	University	of	Nebraska:		
The	Case	for	Training	and	Door	Locks	
	By	Randall	G.	Bowdish,	PhD	Captain,	USN	(Retired)	March	28,	2016	The	gunman	entered	the	actuarial	science	class	early	on	October	12,	1992	at	the	University	of	Nebraska-Lincoln,	raised	his	loaded	AK-47	at	his	20	classmates	and	pulled	the	trigger.	The	gun	jammed.	The	students,	realizing	they	had	a	short	window	of	time	to	escape,	bolted	from	the	class	while	the	gunman	attempted	to	clear	the	jam.	Unable	to	clear	the	jam,	the	gunman	fled	and	a	shooting	massacre	was	averted.1	While	the	University	of	Nebraska	dodged	a	metaphorical	bullet	on	this	occasion,	it	may	be	just	a	matter	of	time	before	it	isn’t	so	lucky.	In	the	aftermath	of	this	shooting	attempt	by	Arthur	McElroy	at	UNL	and	a	host	of	more	recent	horrific	massacres	on	campuses	across	the	country,	the	University	of	Nebraska	still	remains	vulnerable	to	an	active	shooter	incident,	ignoring	protective	measures	that	could	save	lives	in	the	event	of	a	campus	shooting	event.		The	University	does	not	train	its	faculty,	staff,	and	students	on	what	to	do	during	an	active	shooter	incident,	nor	has	it	installed	door	locks	that	can	be	secured	from	the	inside	on	classroom	doors	in	its	older	buildings	as	a	prophylactic	measure	against	shooter	entry	and	the	captive	shooting	of	students	like	“fish	in	a	barrel.”2	Yet,	in	spite	of	being	advised	about	these	security	deficiencies,3	University	of	Nebraska	administrators	have	yet	to	take	action.		Violence	on	campus	has	escalated	since	the	1990s	and	McElroy’s	vain	attempt	at	killing.	The	FBI	noted	in	its	2014	Active	Shooter	Study	that	the	average	number	of	active	shooting	incidents	rose	from	6.4	incidents	annually	between	2000-2007,	to	16.4	incidents	between	2008-2014.4		According	to	the	FBI,	sixty	percent	of	the	incidents	were	over	by	the	time	police	arrived.	While	warning	systems	and	quick	police	response	may	help	save	lives,	the	best	way	to	increase	the	odds	of	survival	for	students	and	faculty	caught	in	the	opening	salvos	of	an	incident	is	by	empowering	them	with	knowledge	of	what	to	do	and	providing	them	with	resources	to	do	it.	Retrofitting	older	classroom	doors	with	door	locks	that	can	be	engaged	from	the	inside	and	training	faculty	and	students	on	how	to	implement	the	“run,	hide,	fight”	protocol	can	provide	them	with	the	short-term	survival	measures	needed	until	help	arrives.	The	purpose	of	this	article	is	to	inform	University	of	Nebraska	students,	faculty	and	stakeholders	of	these	two	key	security	deficiencies	that	exist	on	campus	and	make	them	knowledgeable	about	actions	that	can	be	implemented	to	mitigate	active	shooter	related	deaths.	Five	classroom	shooting	incidents	follow,	along	with	
the	lessons	that	were	learned	from	each,	and	specific	response	recommendations	for	UNL	students.	
Virginia	Tech	Shooting	and	Lessons	Learned		The	worst	campus	shooting	incident	occurred	at	Virginia	Tech,	the	deadliest	shooting	event	in	U.S.	history,	where	32	students	and	faculty	were	massacred	on	April	16,	2007.	Seung	Hui	Cho	used	two	semi-automatic	pistols—a	.22-caliber	Walther	and	a	9	mm	Glock	19—to	kill	two	students	in	West	Ambler	Johnston	Hall	and	30	students	in	classrooms	in	Norris	Hall.	After	the	event,	a	Virginia	Tech	Review	Panel	was	convened	by	Virginia	Governor	Timothy	M.	Kaine	to	assess	the	events	and	handling	of	the	incident,	with	the	charter	to	make	recommendations	that	would	help	colleges	prevent	or	mitigate	such	incidents	in	the	future.5	While	the	Review	Board	discovered	a	host	of	key	findings	in	the	areas	of	campus	alerting,	mental	health	evaluation,	the	role	and	training	of	police,	two	key	findings	that	could	save	lives	have	largely	been	ignored	until	after	shootings	have	occurred	on	campus.	The	first	finding	involved	inadequate	training	for	students,	faculty	and	staff	on	what	to	do	during	an	active	shooter	incident.	According	to	the	Review	Panel,		The	training	of	staff	and	students	for	emergencies	situations	at	Virginia	Tech	did	not	include	shooting	incidents.	A	messaging	system	works	more	effectively	if	resident	advisors	in	dormitories,	all	faculty,	and	all	other	staff	from	janitors	to	the	president	have	instruction	and	training	for	coping	with	emergencies	of	all	types.6		The	Review	Panel	followed	this	finding	with	a	recommendation:	Students,	faculty,	and	staff	should	be	trained	annually	about	responding	to	various	emergencies	and	about	the	notification	systems	that	will	be	used.7				 A	second,	more	controversial	finding	involved	classroom	door	locks,	with	which	the	doors	at	Norris	Hall,	the	site	of	30	of	the	killings,	were	not	equipped.		According	to	the	Review	Panel:		 Virginia	Tech	did	not	have	classroom	door	locks	operable	from	the	inside	of	the	room.	Whether	to	add	such	locks	is	controversial.	They	can	block	entry	of	an	intruder	and	compartmentalize	an	attack.	Locks	can	be	simple	manually	operated	devices	or	part	of	more	sophisticated	systems	that	use	electromechanical	locks	operated	from	a	central	security	point	in	a	building	or	even	university-wide.	The	locks	must	be	easily	opened	from	the	inside	to	allow	escape	from	a	fire	or	other	emergency	when	that	is	the	safer	course	of	action.	While	adding	locks	to	classrooms	may	seem	an	obvious	safety	feature,	some	voiced	concern	that	locks	could	facilitate	rapes	or	assaults	in	classrooms	and	increase	university	liability.	(An	attacker	could	drag	someone	inside	a	room	at	night	and	lock	the	door,	blocking	assistance.)	
On	the	other	hand,	a	locked	room	can	be	a	place	of	refuge	when	one	is	pursued.	On	balance,	the	panel	generally	thought	having	locks	on	classroom	doors	was	a	good	idea.	Yet,	in	spite	of	the	Review	Board’s	general	consensus	that	door	locks	were	advised,	it	nonetheless	stopped	short	of	recommending	them	as	a	way	of	mitigating	deaths	in	future	incidents.	This	is	curious	in	light	of	the	descriptions	of	violence	that	occurred	in	the	second	floor	classrooms	that	didn’t	have	locks.8		After	Seung	Hui	Cho	entered	room	206	and	killed	Professor	Loganathan	and	several	students,	he	then	crossed	the	hall	to	room	207	and	murdered	Professor	Christopher	Bishop	and	several	other	students.	One	student	in	room	207	vainly	attempted	to	rip	a	podium	from	its	foundation	in	order	to	blockade	the	un-lockable	door.		In	classroom	211,	Professor	Couture-Nowak’s	students	also	attempted	to	barricade	the	door,	but	Cho	was	able	to	push	his	way	in,	kill	the	professor	and	shoot	several	students.		By	this	time,	students	in	room	205	had	heard	the	shots	and	cries	for	help;	they	barricaded	their	door	by	using	their	feet	as	stoppers.	Cho	attempted	to	push	his	way	in	but	was	unsuccessful,	so	he	fired	through	the	door	but	didn’t	hit	any	of	the	students,	who	were	lying	low.	Cho	returned	to	room	211	and	went	around	the	room	shooting	additional	students,	then	attempted	to	enter	room	204.	Professor	Liviu	Librescu	had	braced	his	body	against	the	door,	while	telling	his	students	to	escape	out	the	window.		Librescu	was	fatally	shot	by	Cho	through	the	door,	but	had	delayed	Cho’s	entry	long	enough	to	allow	10	students	to	escape.	While	it	is	conjecture	to	conclude	that	door	locks	would	have	saved	lives	in	this	case,	it	nonetheless	seems	logical	given	Cho’s	strategy	to	use	classrooms	as	killing	floors.	The	carnage	ended	when	Cho	shot	and	killed	himself.	
Northern	Illinois	University	Shooting	and	Lessons	Learned	Five	lives	were	lost	and	27	were	injured	in	the	Northern	Illinois	University	shooting	incident	on	February	14,	2008,	after	Steven	Kazmierczak	entered	a	geology	class	in	the	auditorium	of	Cole	Hall	and	began	his	deadly	shooting	spree.	Armed	with	a	12	gauge	sawed-off	shotgun	and	three	handguns	with	eight	loaded	magazines,	Kazmierczak	first	opened	fire	with	his	shotgun	from	the	stage	into	the	audience.	When	his	shotgun	ammunition	was	expended,	he	switched	weapons	to	his	Glock	semi-automatic	pistol	and	then	walked	up	and	down	the	aisles	and	shot	students	who	were	either	frozen	in	fear	or	attempting	to	hide	between	seats.9	Kazmierczak	then	killed	himself	before	police	arrived.	Five	minutes	later,	the	school	posted	a	warning	that	a	possible	gunman	was	on	campus.10	Following	the	incident,	the	Governor	of	Illinois	established	the	“State	of	Illinois	Campus	Security	Task	Force”	to	conduct	a	review	of	the	incident,	which	published	its	own	key	findings	and	lessons	learned	from	the	tragedy.	Amongst	the	findings	was	that	not	only	police,	but	faculty,	staff	and	students	also	required	training	about	how	to	respond	during	an	active	shooter	incident.	According	to	the	report,	the	Response	Committee	found	that:	
Comprehensive	training	and	exercise	of	emergency	response	plans	and	systems	are	a	necessary	part	of	emergency	preparedness.	Training	for	staff,	faculty	and	students	in	recognizing	and	understanding	emergency	alerts	and	the	appropriate	immediate	response	actions	are	essential	to	safeguarding	lives.	The	report	went	on	to	recommend	that:	Colleges	and	universities	should	ensure	that	students,	faculty	and	staff	are	informed	regarding	their	roles	and	responsibilities	in	preparing	for	and	responding	to	emergency	situations.		
U.S.	Department	of	Homeland	Security	Offers	Course	of	Action	By	this	time,	it	was	clear	from	the	history	of	campus	shootings	that	more	than	police	and	warnings	were	required	if	lives	were	to	be	saved	in	the	crucial	minutes	prior	to	police	arrival	on	the	scene.	Training	was	needed	to	turn	students	and	faculty	from	helpless,	panic-stricken	victims	to	informed,	quick-acting	evaders	and	fighters.	In	October	of	2008,	the	U.S.	Department	of	Homeland	Security	published	its	booklet,	“Active	Shooter:	How	to	Respond,”	which	contained	a	simple	survival	protocol	for	what	to	do	if	in	the	vicinity	of	an	active	shooter.	The	protocol	was	developed	in	a	cooperative	effort	by	not	only	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security	and	law	enforcement,	but	retailers	and	mall	security	agencies	concerned	about	active	shooters	in	highly	vulnerable	and	target	rich	shopping	malls.11	The	protocol	was	designed	to	provide	students	and	faculty	with	alternatives	that	were	optimized	for	given	situations,	whether	an	escape	path	was	available,	a	safe	refuge	was	at	hand,	or	the	only	option	left	was	to	fight	for	survival.	The	protocol	included	the	following	measures:	1.	Evacuate:	If	there	is	an	accessible	escape	path,	attempt	to	evacuate	the	premises.	Be	sure	to:		
• Have	an	escape	route	and	plan	in	mind		
• Evacuate	regardless	of	whether	others	agree	to	follow		
• Leave	your	belongings	behind		
• Help	others	escape,	if	possible		
• Prevent	individuals	from	entering	an	area	where	the	active	shooter	may	be		
• Keep	your	hands	visible		
• Follow	the	instructions	of	any	police	officers		
• Do	not	attempt	to	move	wounded	people		
• Call	911	when	you	are	safe		2.	Hide	out:	If	evacuation	is	not	possible,	find	a	place	to	hide	where	the	active	shooter	is	less	likely	to	find	you.		Your	hiding	place	should:		
• Be	out	of	the	active	shooter’s	view		
• Provide	protection	if	shots	are	fired	in	your	direction	(i.e.,	and	office	with	a	closed	and	locked	door)		
• Not	trap	you	or	restrict	your	options	for	movement		
• To	prevent	an	active	shooter	from	entering	your	hiding	place:		
o Lock	the	door		
o Blockade	the	door	with	heavy	furniture		
• If	the	active	shooter	is	nearby:		
o Lock	the	door		
o Silence	your	cell	phone	and/or	pager		
o Turn	off	any	source	of	noise	(i.e.,	radios,	televisions)		
o Hide	behind	large	items	(i.e.,	cabinets,	desks)		
o Remain	quiet		
• If	evacuation	and	hiding	out	are	not	possible:		
o Remain	calm		
o Dial	911,	if	possible,	to	alert	police	to	the	active	shooter’s	location		
o If	you	cannot	speak,	leave	the	line	open	and	allow	the	dispatcher	to	listen		3.	Take	action	against	the	active	shooter:		As	a	last	resort,	and	only	when	your	life	is	in	imminent	danger,	attempt	to	disrupt	and/or	incapacitate	the	active	shooter	by:		
• Acting	as	aggressively	as	possible	against	him/her		
• Throwing	items	and	improvising	weapons		
• Yelling		
• Committing	to	your	actions		In	the	case	of	the	Virginia	Tech	massacre	in	Norris	Hall,	the	evacuation	option	was	not	available.	If	doors	had	been	equipped	with	door	locks,	the	hide	option	might	have	saved	lives.	The	fight	option	may	not	have	been	possible	given	the	worldview	of	faculty	and	students	at	the	time	(fighting	back	wasn’t	even	considered),	or	it	wasn’t	determined	to	be	a	viable	alternative	for	the	situation.		
Oikos	University	Shooting	and	Lessons	Learned	A	dozen	nursing	students	at	Oikos	University	were	taking	an	exam	on	April	2,	2012	when	One	Goh	entered	through	a	back	door	with	a	.45	caliber	pistol	in	one	hand	while	holding	the	school’s	receptionist	hostage	with	the	other.12	He	ordered	everyone	to	the	front	of	the	room	before	shooting	the	receptionist.	Some	of	the	students	complied	with	Goh’s	demand	to	come	to	the	front	of	the	room,	but	others	ran.	Goh	then	turned	his	weapon	upon	the	compliant	students,	killing	six	more	and	wounding	three	others.13	Most	of	the	students	who	ran	survived.	Goh	left	the	building	and	was	eventually	captured	by	police	at	a	local	supermarket,	which	he	had	driven	to	in	a	car	of	one	of	his	slain	victims.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	incident,	Active	Response	Training,	a	private	company	that	provides	active	shooter	training	for	pay,	published	a	list	of	nine	lessons	learned	
from	the	Oikos	University	shooting.	Included	in	the	lessons	was	that	“students	need	to	be	taught	proper	responses	when	a	person	begins	shooting,”	and	that	they	must	“recognize	opportunities	to	act,”	such	as	when	a	gunman	reloads.14	
Purdue	University	Shooting	and	Lessons	Learned	At	Purdue	University,	a	lone	gunman	shot	and	killed	a	fellow	teaching	assistant	in	a	classroom	full	of	other	students	in	the	electrical	engineering	building.	Cody	Cousins,	an	undergraduate	teaching	assistant	in	computer	engineering,	entered	a	basement	classroom	on	January	21,	2014	and	murdered	Andrew	Bolt.		The	shooter	then	left	the	building,	unarmed,	and	surrendered	to	police.15		The	incident	not	only	caught	many	by	surprise,	but	also	illuminated	the	poor	state	of	training	on	how	to	respond	during	such	an	event,	even	after	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security	had	published	its	recommended	actions.	By	this	time,	most	universities	had	posted	the	active	shooter	protocol	on	their	web	sites.	However,	at	Purdue	University,	many	faculty	members	were	still	unaware	of	what	to	do	in	an	active	shooter	situation.	Said	one	frustrated	student,	who	was	in	the	classroom	directly	above	where	the	shooting	took	place,	“I	think	Purdue	needs	to	rethink	how	they	train	their	faculty	and	instructors	to	respond	to	these	situations.”16		After	the	initial	shot,	Purdue	professors	in	surrounding	classrooms	continued	to	teach	class	as	if	nothing	had	happened,	in	spite	of	a	text-message	warning	and	pleas	by	students	to	lock	the	doors	and	turn	off	the	lights	in	accordance	with	the	“hide”	recommended	protocol.	According	to	a	student	witness,	Professor	Rebecca	Trax	joked,	“I’ll	have	the	TA	tackle	him	if	he	comes	in.”17	Professor	Trax	left	the	door	unlocked,	the	lights	on,	while	she	continued	to	lecture.	Another	faculty	member,	Miyoung	Hong,	an	instructor	in	the	College	of	Liberal	Arts,	insisted	that	there	was	no	threat	and	opened	the	classroom	door	after	another	instructor	had	closed	it.18		Students	also	expressed	anger	that	many	classroom	doors	were	not	equipped	with	door	locks.		Three	months	after	the	incident,	Purdue	University	released	a	report	conducted	by	an	18-person	security	feedback	panel	made	up	of	faculty,	students,	and	a	parent.		Recommendations	included	the	ability	to	lock	doors	from	the	inside	without	a	key,	expanding	the	text	alert	system,	and	providing	additional	training	so	everyone	knows	what	to	do	during	an	emergency.19		In	the	transmittal	letter	from	the	panel	to	university	President	Mitchell	Daniels,	panel	chair	Patricia	Hart	highlighted:20	
• One	of	the	most	frequently	received	responses	concerned	locks	on	doors.	The	panel	takes	this	topic	very	seriously	and	recommends	additional	work	be	done	to	formally	develop	a	strategy	and	understand	all	the	pertinent	details,	including	fire	code	requirements,	ADA	compliance	and	practical	considerations	for	implementation	of	a	final	plan.		
• Training,	education	and	preparedness	are	essential.	…	There	is	training	and	education,	there	are	detailed	procedures,	and	we	all	need	to	take	responsibility	to	attend	training,	to	learn	and	know	how	to	respond	and	to	act	accordingly	in	any	emergency	situation.		However,	the	report	also	highlighted	one	of	the	primary	reasons	universities	have	balked	at	installing	door	locks—high	costs.	According	to	the	report,	it	would	cost	approximately	$2	million	to	convert	the	over	41,000	doors	with	lockable	hardware.21	While	it	is	regrettable	that	it	took	a	death	on	campus	to	spur	administrators	to	do	something,	to	its	credit,	Purdue	University	did	take	aggressive	action	on	the	panel’s	recommendations,	in	spite	of	the	costs.	By	the	start	of	the	fall	semester,	the	university	put	out	a	press	release	stating	the	university	was	taking	the	following	steps:22	
• As	part	of	a	pilot	program,	emergency	beacons,	door	locks	and	desktop	pop-up	alert	windows	are	being	installed	across	campus.		
• Door	locks	are	being	installed	in	these	same	classrooms.	These	locks	will	be	compliant	with	ADA	requirements	and	fire	codes.23		
• Desktop	pop-up	alerts	have	been	installed	on	a	majority	of	classroom	computers	and	on	machines	in	a	majority	of	university	computer	labs.	A	window	will	pop	up	on	a	machine	with	a	message	when	a	Purdue	ALERT	is	issued.		
• The	Purdue	Emergency	Twitter	account	has	been	integrated	with	the	Purdue	ALERT	text	message	system.	Additionally,	the	Purdue	University	Homeland	Security	Institute	conducted	detailed	computer	modeling	to	determine	the	best	options	to	save	lives.		Given	that	a	shooter	averages	three	victims	per	minute	and	that	the	average	time	of	response	by	police	is	10	minutes,	the	modeling	revealed	that	the	two	most	effective	means	of	slowing	down	a	shooter	are	locks	on	schoolroom	doors	and	armed	school	personnel.	According	to	Institute	director	Eric	Dietz,	the	two	measures	together	could	reduce	the	number	of	victims	by	up	to	70	percent.24		
Umpqua	Community	College	Lessons	Learned	Chris	Harper	Mercer	fatally	shot	and	killed	an	assistant	professor	and	eight	students	at	Umpqua	Community	College	on	October	1,	2015.		Mercer	entered	the	writing	class	held	in	classroom	15	of	Snyder	Hall,	fired	a	warning	shot,	and	ordered	everyone	in	the	classroom	to	lie	down	in	the	center	of	the	room.	He	then	put	his	backpack	on	the	front	desk,	pulled	out	an	envelope	which	he	handed	to	a	student,	stating,	“hey,	kid	with	the	glasses,	you	are	the	lucky	one;	I	will	not	shoot	you	if	give	
this	to	the	cops.”	The	papers	and	thumb	drive	in	the	envelope	contained	racial	and	social	hatred	writings.25		Mercer	allowed	the	chosen	student	to	move	to	the	back	of	the	classroom	before	he	began	picking	off	the	professor	and	students	in	the	center	of	the	classroom.	He	told	a	wheelchair	bound	woman	who	had	followed	his	order	to	get	down	on	the	floor	to	get	back	up,	then	shot	her.26		He	then	asked	two	students	their	religions.	After	they	replied	Christian,	he	shot	them.	The	shooter	killed	himself	after	exchanging	fire	with	police,	who	arrived	six	minutes	after	multiple	911	calls.	Joe	Olson,	who	had	retired	as	President	of	Umpqua	Community	College	several	months	prior	to	the	incident,	stated	that	the	college	had	considered	hiring	an	armed	security	guard	to	protect	against	such	an	event,	but	decided	against	it,	believing	the	campus	was	safe	and	that	having	an	armed	guard	might	damage	the	culture	of	the	school.27	Umpqua	Community	College	has	since	requested	$158,455	from	the	Oregon	Legislature	for	door	locks	to	rooms	that	don’t	have	them	installed	and	$145,146	for	three	additional	security	guards	in	its	2015-2017	budget.28	
Inaction	Until	After	a	Shooting		 When	one	looks	at	the	low	probability	of	an	active	shooter	incident	on	a	college	campus	against	the	high	costs	and	efforts	associated	with	training,	installing	door	locks,	and	other	protective	measures,	many	universities	decide	to	accept	the	risk	of	a	shooter	and	not	spend	the	money	for	additional	protective	measures.	In	the	cases	explored	above,	however,	all	of	the	schools	victimized	by	active	shooters	incidents	chose	to	spend	more	money	on	measures	to	mitigate	deaths	after	an	incident	on	campus.	While	actions	after	an	incident	may	help	to	prevent	future	deaths,	they	are	“a	day	late	and	a	dollar	short”	for	the	previous	victims.	Additionally,	one	is	left	to	question	whether	a	university	takes	such	action	as	a	public	relations	measure	or	out	of	real	concern.	Either	way,	it	doesn’t	reflect	well	on	the	university’s	leadership—taking	action	only	to	salve	the	school’s	reputation	or	not	having	the	foresight	to	take	appropriate	measures	in	the	first	place.	
What	Can	University	of	Nebraska	Students	Do?		 Given	the	University	of	Nebraska’s	inaction	on	retrofitting	door	locks	in	its	older	classrooms	and	training	personnel	on	what	to	do	during	an	active	shooter	incident,	the	question	arises	as	to	what	students	and	faculty	can	do	to	protect	themselves.	Obviously,	becoming	familiar	with	the	recommended	active	shooter	protocol	is	the	first	step.	The	most	recent	version	of	the	university’s	active	shooter	protocol	discusses	measures	in	terms	of	the	U.S.	Department	of	Homeland	Security’s	“run,	hide,	fight”	measures	(November	30,	2015)	which	are	effectively	the	same	as	those	put	forth	in	the	2008	version.		
The	University	of	Nebraska	has	published	the	“run,	hide,	fight”	protocol	online	in	both	video	and	print	form.	Finding	it	on	the	University’s	web	pages,	however,	can	be	daunting	as	it	is	buried	deep	in	subdirectories	(UNL/Emergency	Planning	and	Preparedness/Emergency	Procedures/	Shooting	Incident/Active	Shooter	Response	Training).	It	is	easiest	found	by	typing	“active	shooter”	in	the	university	web	page	search	engine	or	through	the	following	link:	http://emergency.unl.edu/shotsfired.		As	for	specific	action	to	be	taken	in	response	to	an	active	shooter,	running	away	from	the	scene	is	likely	the	best	option,	if	an	open	avenue	of	escape	presents	itself,	and	the	shooter	isn’t	“herding”	students	to	a	kill	zone	where	an	accomplice	waits	to	ambush	the	fleeing	students.	Students	that	find	themselves	in	a	classroom	with	a	shooter	outside	in	the	hallway	or	in	an	adjacent	classroom,	however,	are	faced	with	a	more	vexing	survival	dilemma,	if	the	classroom	door	can’t	be	locked	from	the	inside	and	rushing	out	into	the	hallway	may	put	them	in	the	sights	of	the	shooter.	Additionally,	if	the	shooter	subsequently	breaches	the	door,	it	places	students	at	risk	of	being	shot	like	“fish	in	a	barrel,”	as	has	occurred	in	the	deadliest	of	incidents,	described	above.			 If	students	and	faculty	find	themselves	trapped	in	a	classroom	without	a	door	lock,	one	option	is	to	barricade	the	door	with	desks	and	other	furniture	as	was	done	during	the	Virginia	Tech	incident.	However,	many	doors	without	locks	open	to	the	hall,	which	means	a	shooter	will	only	be	slowed	down,	and	will	eventually	obtain	access	given	the	will	to	do	so.		At	this	point,	if	students	and	faculty	cannot	escape	out	of	a	window	or	alternate	exit,	they	have	no	choice	but	to	stand	and	fight,	as	recommended	in	the	U.S.	Department	of	Homeland	Security	protocol.	One	fight	measure	that	has	not	been	adequately	explored	is	the	use	of	mace/pepper	spray	against	the	assailant	by	students	and	faculty.	While	campuses	prohibit	firearms,	many	do	not	prohibit	non-lethal	incapacitating	agents.	The	UNL	weapons	policy	specifically	prohibits	“guns,	knives,	and	explosives,”	though	it	leaves	open	a	prohibition	on	unnamed	devices	that	are	“capable	of	producing	death,	harm	to	person	or	property,	or	bodily	injury.”29	However,	former	UNL	Assistant	Police	Chief	Mylo	Bushing	stated	in	2001	that	pepper	spray	was	OK.30		Many	female	students	already	carry	mace/pepper	spray	as	a	defensive	measure	against	rape	or	attack.31	There	is	nothing	that	prohibits	male	students	from	carrying	it	in	their	backpacks,	either.	While	the	use	of	incapacitating	agents	against	a	shooter,	along	with	throwing	desk	items	and	personal	objects	at	the	shooter,	may	be	a	poor	substitute	to	deadly	force	options,	it	will	still	allow	trapped	students	to	at	least	seize	the	initiative	(a	basic	warfare	principle),	and	provide	a	chance	to	either	take	down	the	assailant	or	escape	the	room.	However,	faculty	and	students	need	to	trained	in	its	use—that	is,	be	aware	of	it	as	an	active	shooter	measure	and	know	how	to	use	it,	to	include	activating	the	sprayer	under	duress,	the	range	of	the	spray,		how	far	to	stand	away	from	the	assailant,	and	the	use	of	cover	while	deploying	it.	
With	the	University	of	Nebraska	unwilling	to	provide	formal	training	for	faculty,	staff,	and	students	(posting	a	video	on	a	web	sight	does	not	constitute	adequate	training	by	the	University),	it	is	thus	incumbent	upon	students	to	train	themselves	and	their	faculty.	At	the	first	meeting	of	a	course	during	a	new	semester,	students	should	ask	their	instructors	about	not	only	how	the	class	will	handle	an	active	shooter,	but	other	emergencies,	like	fire	and	tornado.	Most	instructors,	realizing	it	is	their	responsibility	to	lead	students	in	such	an	event,	will	find	out,	if	they	don’t	already	know.		For	those	that	don’t	bother	to	find	out,	students	should	register	a	complaint	against	the	instructor	with	the	chair	of	the	department.		Of	course,	nothing	herein	prevents	students	from	placing	pressure	on	the	University	of	Nebraska	administration	to	retrofit	door	locks	in	older	classrooms	and	conduct	training	by	writing	to	their	parents	and	public	officials	about	the	active	shooter	deficiencies	that	exist	on	campus.		At	a	university	that	markets	itself	as	a	place	to	“make	waves	where	there	is	no	ocean,”	such	activity	should	be	encouraged.	In	fact,	students	and	faculty	may	find	it	motivating	to	know	that	the	University	of	Nebraska	Police	Department	has	adequate	door	locks	in	its	building.	Students	deserve	a	safe	learning	environment	also.		Training	and	door	locks	provide	a	way	to	empower	potential	victims	into	survivors.	They	provide	them	with	forethought	for	action	and	temporary	safe	refuge	against	an	active	shooter,	rather	than	treating	students	like	helpless	“sheep”	to	be	protected	by	a	police	“shepherd.”	It	provides	students	and	faculty	with	a	fighting	chance,	rather	than	desperation	and	pleas	for	mercy,	which	have	granted	all	too	rarely	in	active	shooting	incidents.		The	active	shooter	issue	has	come	full	circle	at	UNL.		Arthur	McElroy,	the	failed	1992	gunman	at	UNL,	was	released	from	the	Lincoln	Regional	Center	in	2015,	judged	to	be	too	sick	and	feeble	to	present	a	danger	to	anyone.	But	that	does	not	mean	there	isn’t	someone	out	there	willing	to	repeat	such	an	incident.		 	
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